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A B S T R A C T
In the governance of natural resources, transparency has been linked to improved accountability, as well as
enforceability, compliance, sustainability, and ultimately more equitable outcomes. Here, good practices in
transparency relevant to the emerging governance of deep-seabed mining in the Area beyond national jur-
isdiction are identiﬁed and compared with current practices of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The
analysis found six areas of good transparency practice that could improve the accountability of deep-seabed
mining: i) access to information; ii) reporting; iii) quality assurance; iv) compliance information / accreditation;
v) public participation; and vi) ability to review / appeal decisions. The ISA has in some instances adopted
progressive practices regarding its rules, regulations, and procedures (e.g. including the precautionary ap-
proach). However, the results here show that overall the ISA will need to consider improvements in each of the
six categories above, in order to reﬂect contemporary best transparency practices, as well as meeting historical
expectations embodied in the principle of the ‘common heritage of mankind’. This would involve a revision of its
rules and procedures. The ongoing review and drafting of the ISA’s deep-seabed mining exploitation regulations
oﬀers a once-in-a-generation opportunity to improve upon the current situation. Findings from this analysis are
summarised in 18 recommendations, including publication of annual reports submitted by contractors, pub-
lication of annual ﬁnancial statements, development of a transparency policy, compliance reporting, and
dedicated access to Committee meetings.
1. Introduction
This paper identiﬁes good practices in transparency that could lead
to improved accountability in the emerging governance of deep-seabed
mining in ‘the Area’ beyond national jurisdiction. To do so, recognised
best practices from related marine and natural resource sectors are
considered.
1.1. Transparency in the governance of natural resources
In the governance of natural resources, transparency is found to be a
necessary factor for improved accountability, as well as enforceability,
compliance, sustainability, and ultimately more equitable outcomes
[13,22]. In the extractive resource industries in particular, transparency
is emphasised with regard to improving governance ills, particularly
accountability [13], and has been hailed as an important step to re-
solving governance-related problems emanating from natural resources
in national jurisdiction, such as ﬁscal responsibility, the choice of in-
vestments, and project suitability [22,45]. Well-established non-gov-
ernmental organisations, including Transparency International,1 the
Natural Resources Governance Institute,2 and the U4 Anti-Corruption
Resource Centre3 promote transparency as a way to deter corruption
[11]. Other factors, such as political stability, regulatory quality, and
institutional competence, also play critical roles in the good governance
of marine natural resources [11,42,50]. However, without transparency
in deep-seabed mining, the details concerning allocation of interna-
tional seabed mineral resources to private and state operators, ensuing
environmental impacts, and regulatory compliance, will remain largely
unknown. Greater transparency is necessary to allow for meaningful
review or appeals, and can lead to greater public accountability and
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engagement, which has been interpreted as consistent with the prin-
ciple of the common heritage of humankind [40].
1.2. Deep-seabed mining
The potentially vast mineral wealth of the ocean was popularised
over ﬁfty years ago in an academic book, ‘The Mineral Resources of the
Sea’, that captured the imagination of scientists, businessmen, and
government representatives alike [16,51]. Spurred by record-high mi-
neral commodity prices in 2011,4 the evolution of technical cap-
abilities, and the approval of international regulations for prospecting
and exploration, the prospect of deep-seabed mining (DSM) has had
renewed attention. In the three years from 2011 to 2014, thirteen ap-
plications were made to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) for
exploration contracts –more than any period before or since. As of
August 2017, there had been a total of twenty-nine exploration appli-
cations to the ISA, including seven that were carried over from ‘pioneer’
contractors in the 1970s and 1980s. In response to this renewed in-
dustrial interest, DSM has also attracted renewed scientiﬁc, legal, and
policy attention (e.g. [52,41,7]).
Combined with the pending expiration of the original 15-year
contracts issued in the early 2000s, this renewed interest spurred the
ISA towards development of its exploitation regulations. A preliminary
‘Zero Draft’ of these regulations was released for public comment in
July 2016 [33]. Subsequently, a ‘tentative working draft’ discussion
document concerning environmental aspects of these regulations was
released in early 2017 (henceforth, ‘Discussion Document’; [34]). In
August of 2017, the ISA released ‘Draft Regulations on Exploitation of
Mineral Resources in the Area’ (henceforth, ‘Draft Regulations’; [35]).
The deep-seabed beyond national jurisdiction, administered
through the ISA, has a unique legal status. In 1970, the United Nations
(UN) General Assembly Resolution 25/2749 declared the seabed and its
resources to be the ‘common heritage of mankind’ [68] – language that
was later incorporated into the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
([67]; Art. 136).5 In what is termed ‘the Area’ beyond national jur-
isdiction, UNCLOS stipulates that all rights in seabed natural resources
are vested in humankind6 as a whole (Art. 137(2)). Financial and other
economic beneﬁts derived from activities in the Area, including DSM,
are to be shared equitably (Art. 157(1)), again for the beneﬁt of hu-
mankind (Art. 140(1); [65]). Also, DSM activities in the Area shall be
carried out in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the
world economy and balanced growth of international trade, and to
promote international cooperation for the overall development of all
countries, especially developing States (Art. 150). However, it has been
questioned whether deep-seabed mining will actually achieve these
lofty beneﬁts, with some calling for a pause in developing the industry
until there is a re-assessment of the legal obligations and whether these
are being met [40,44,69].
Concerning the common heritage of the seabed’s mineral resources,
it has been suggested that the ISA’s States Parties are “…meant to act as
a kind of trustee on behalf of mankind as a whole.” [71]. The principle,
in being so deﬁned, necessarily brings with it governance requirements
beyond normal business-as-usual, particularly concerning fair and
equitable beneﬁt-sharing, and protection and preservation of the
marine environment [39,40]. Given the as yet unknown impacts of full-
scale commercial DSM on the environment and ecosystems, a
precautionary approach has been identiﬁed by the ISA in its ‘Mining
Code’7 (e.g. [28]; reg. 33.2) to reduce risk of unintended outcomes. The
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of
the Sea (ITLOS) in its 2011 Advisory Opinion noted this as part of a
trend towards making the precautionary approach part of customary
international law ([38], para 135).
When discussing the contractual agreements between a sponsoring
State and a Contractor, the Seabed Disputes Chamber linked the need
for transparency with the common heritage of humankind principle.
The Chamber noted that the contractual arrangement would, “…
moreover, lack transparency. It will be diﬃcult to verify, through
publicly available measures, that the sponsoring State had met its ob-
ligations.” ([38], para 225). It goes on to say that “…the role of the
sponsoring State is to contribute to the common interest of all States in
the proper implementation of the principle of the common heritage of
mankind […] Contractual arrangements alone cannot satisfy the ob-
ligation undertaken by the sponsoring State.” (ITLOS, 2011, para 226).
Thus, the lack of transparency that can arise from conﬁdential con-
tractual arrangements is seen by the Chamber as a hindrance to the
proper implementation of the common heritage of humankind prin-
ciple. Contractual agreements have to date been the basis of sponsoring
State-Contractor relationships, and the relationships between the ISA
and these parties.
The transparency of the ISA has been evaluated by stakeholders as
insuﬃcient, particularly concerning access to Commission meetings,
data, and information to assess if a Contractor has met its obligations
(ISA, [33]; [57]). When compared to the management of international
ﬁsh stocks by regional ﬁsheries management organisations, the ISA’s
practices were found to be least transparent [6]. Whilst many interna-
tional maritime-focussed organisations began discussing transparency
in the mid-late 1990s, such discussions did not occur within the ISA,
and only appear in the records of the ISA’s annual meetings very re-
cently, after 2014 when a study on the topic was published [5]. How-
ever, over the past two years, the procedures of the ISA appear to be
opening up somewhat to external participation; for example, proceed-
ings have included internet-based consultations for the ﬁrst time.
1.3. Elements of good governance
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra [3] compiled a database of codes of
good governance developed worldwide from 1978 until the end of
1999. According to their research, these codes of governance began in
the corporate sector, mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Only in
the late 1990s did governments and inter-governmental bodies begin to
issue their own codes of good governance. In 1997, the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) published a policy document, Govern-
ance for Sustainable Human Development, which set the mould for many
others that would follow [66,17].
Codes and guidance concerning good governance generally include
transparency, public inclusiveness & participation, accountability, and
rule of law (Supplementary materials, Table s1). These four elements
are inter-dependent in practice. The focus of this paper is mainly on the
ﬁrst two of them – transparency, which is taken to include public
participation, as well as to some extent the third element, account-
ability, as reﬂected in the ability to review and appeal decisions.
The purpose here is not to further evaluate the above good gov-
ernance elements beyond what has already been published by these
authors and many others. However, it is worth noting that in natural
resource governance, positive outcomes as a result of transparency can
be diﬃcult to demonstrate [43]. The limited mandate and power of
voluntary initiatives, stakeholder resistance, and dependence on strong
4 World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink Sheet); http://www.worldbank.org/en/
research/commodity-markets#1 accessed Oct. 2017.
5 Reﬂecting the internationalist spirit of those times, similar text can be found in the
Outer Space Treaty (1967; ‘common interest of mankind’) and the [54], though these
have proven to be far less inﬂuential than UNCLOS. Arguably the other side of the same
coin, the UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order
(1975) emphasised regaining eﬀective state control of natural resources from foreign
interests.
6 Although UNCLOS uses the term ‘mankind,’ this paper shall use the more con-
temporary ‘humankind’ unless in direct quotation.
7 The ISA uses the term ‘Mining Code’ to collectively refer to all its regulations con-
cerning mining exploration and exploitation. Currently, only exploration regulations have
been ﬁnalised.
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civil society (which is absent in many developing states interested in
DSM [8,9,47]) can lead to the apparent failure of resource governance
transparency initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI)8 [61]. Lack of timely data and lack of concrete en-
forcement measures (e.g. aﬃrmative action from investors) have also
been postulated as reasons why transparency initiatives have not al-
ways ushered in anticipated change.9 Nevertheless, transparency is still
seen to be necessary, though far from suﬃcient, in ensuring good re-
source governance [63,64]. In short, it is the tentative ﬁrst step, often
made haltingly, on a long road toward natural resource governance
reform and greater accountability. The importance ascribed to trans-
parency is reﬂected in its near-universal appearance in codes of conduct
and best practices that have emerged since the 1990s, as outlined in
supplementary Table s1.
1.4. Analytical objectives
In order to place DSM into a broader context of international
practices, a broad review was undertaken of rules, regulations and
codes of conduct that are plausibly relevant to the emerging governance
of deep-seabed mining in the Area beyond national jurisdiction. These
were then compared with current and emerging practices of the ISA.
Here, the work is summarised and we draw some general conclusions,
highlighting areas that may need further consideration and improve-
ment. We assume here that if these elements of transparency have been
found to be important in the governance of other kinds of natural re-
sources, then they are likely to be so for deep-seabed mineral resources
as well.
2. Methods
To identify elements of transparency that constitute existing and
emerging best practices plausibly applicable to the good governance of
DSM, a review of existing codes of conduct, regulations, international
agreements, and voluntary standards was undertaken (henceforth,
standards). From these, 14 indicative standards were selected using four
general criteria: 1) it should in some way be applicable or comparable
to DSM; e.g. land-based mining, natural resource ﬁnance, etc.; 2) when
seen to be covering similar issues, international standards are favoured
over national ones for reasons of their broader applicability (13 of the
14); 3) in order to gauge current and emerging best practices, newer
standards are favoured over older ones, when covering similar content
(ranging from 1996 – present); and 4) better-known standards emerging
from larger established institutions were favoured over more obscure or
niche industry examples.
Several standards were rejected owing to a lack of speciﬁcity; i.e.
being without language that can be translated into speciﬁc rules, po-
licies, or actions. For example, the World Economic Forum’s Responsible
Mineral Development Initiative encourages “transparent processes & ar-
rangements”, but does not elaborate on what elements would char-
acterise such arrangements [70]. Likewise, the widely recognised UN
Global Compact uses language that is too general to interpret speciﬁcally
into best practices; for example, Principle 10 suggests that “Businesses
should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and
bribery,” but does not say how.10 Other standards that were not
included have limited universal applicability (e.g. national freedom of
information legislation – which varies considerably across time and
jurisdictions11); inapplicability to DSM (e.g. consumer right-to-know
laws); or, redundancy, as discussed below.
The 14 standards of focus in this paper are representative of three
general kinds, regarding: i) operators’ activities (9); ii) regulators’
conduct (5); and iii) third party12 conduct (213). Each of these three
focal points are (or could be) regulated by the ISA through its Mining
Code and, concerning itself, through its internal rules of procedure.
Transparency is a common theme throughout the 14 standards
(Table 1).
International and national standards are not covered exhaustively;
i.e. there are other standards, similar to those selected. For example, the
ten principles of the International Council on Mining & Metals (ICMM, no
date), considered here, are similar to elements contained in national
codes such as Towards Sustainable Mining of the Mining Association of
Canada14 and the Chinese Responsible Mining Guidelines, not considered
here. There is only one code of conduct explicitly aimed at DSM, the
International Marine Minerals Society Code for Environmental Management
of Marine Mining, which is included here. One national code was in-
cluded, the Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines, as an example of current
voluntary best practices in mineral supply chain disclosure, and also
because China is the world’s single largest producer, importer and ex-
porter of minerals and metals, as well as an ISA Party sponsoring the
most DSM exploration contracts. Although the Initiative for Responsible
Mining Assurance code (IRMA) is still in draft, undergoing revisions
(which are publicly viewable), it was decided to include it in order to
provide insight on some of the latest ideas concerning good practices in
the land-based mining industry. Other standards constitute either a
broadly accepted standard (e.g. the Equator Principles with regard to
ﬁnancing), or a recognised international agreement that could con-
ceivably be applicable to aspects of DSM operations (e.g. the London
Convention and Protocol with regard to dumping waste materials at
sea), or an internationally recognised voluntary certiﬁcation scheme
seeking to set out best practices in the natural resource sector (e.g.
EITI). In addition, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (hence-
forth, the Aarhus Convention [2]) is used alongside the UN Law of the
Sea and the ISA’s Mining Code, as another point of legal comparison as
that several of the ISA State Parties are also Parties to that convention,
and hence bound to its terms and conditions.
3. Results and discussion
Expectations concerning transparency and resultant improved ac-
countability were expressed in six general ways: i) access to informa-
tion; ii) reporting; iii) quality assurance; iv) compliance information /
accreditation; v) public participation; and, vi) the ability to review and
appeal decisions (Table 1 and supplementary Table s2). Points (i), (v),
and (vi) are considered the ‘three pillars’ of the Aarhus Convention [2].
Points (ii)-(iv) reﬂect the emphasis on reporting seen in most of the
standards, beginning with the expectation of some sort of publicly
available report (ii), providing evidence / assurance of quality of in-
formation in that report (iii), and assuring compliance with the stan-
dard itself (iv). These six expressions of transparency are discussed
8 EITI does not currently apply to DSM in the Area beyond national jurisdiction.
9 Blogged news item: http://news.trust.org//item/20130526220927-0eaiq.
10 There are related UN guidance documents, but these too are rather unspeciﬁc. For
example, the latest report (forward-dated 2018) says, “Transparency is fast becoming the
new paradigm for conducting business; stakeholders are calling for companies to adopt
sustainable practices and integrate relevant data into reporting cycles. Through the on-
going Reporting for the SDGs Action Platform, the UN Global Compact — together with
the Global Reporting Initiative — will help companies align reporting on the SDGs, and
advise on communicating this data in a meaningful and usable way.” https://www.
unglobalcompact.org/docs/publications/2018_Toolbox.pdf accessed June 2017.
11 Reﬂected, for example, in the incomplete but extensive Wikipedia page on this topic:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom_of_information_laws_by_country.
12 Concerning third parties, the ISA’s situation is unique in that it has entered into
contractual arrangements with both mining entities and their State sponsors, which in
turn are its members and participate in its various governance organs and decision-
making.
13 Numbers exceed the total because two standards are directed at more than one
principal audience (EITI; London convention and Protocol).
14 http://mining.ca/towards-sustainable-mining.
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below, and compared with the ISA’s current practices.
3.1. Access to information
Reasonable access to information is recognised as a central trans-
parency expectation in all but one of the standards examined (ICMM).15
Access to environmental information in particular is associated with the
right of every person “to live in an environment adequate to his or her
health and well-being,” for present and future generations (Aarhus
Convention, Art. 1). Likewise, UNCLOS speciﬁes that data necessary for
the formulation by the ISA of rules, regulations and procedures con-
cerning protection of the marine environment and safety shall not be
deemed proprietary (UNCLOS, Annex III, 14(2)).
The ISA’s current rules and regulations, however, have very little
language about transparency or access to information. Regarding non-
conﬁdentiality of information, the aforementioned requirement in the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, Annex III, 14(2)) is repeated in the Mining
Code, but not elaborated. In contrast, the ISA’s operational rules and
regulations elaborate considerably upon conﬁdentiality (e.g. clauses
12.1–12.3 concerning information presented to the Legal and Technical
Commission [29]). Indeed, the ISA’s focus on conﬁdential information
continues through to present, with new conﬁdentiality protocols under
consideration [35,37]. In Draft Regulations, transparency is only
mentioned twice, in both cases without elaboration or speciﬁc re-
quirements ([35]; reg. 17(e), 81(b)). Conﬁdentiality, on the other hand,
appears in 37 places.
Critically, the proposed and existing rules do not specify how con-
ﬁdentiality is to be determined. The draft documents to date broadly
describe the nature of what could be conﬁdential and what should
constitute publicly available information, but currently leave the deci-
sion of conﬁdentiality to be the prerogative of the Contractor and the
Secretary General, based on designations provided by the Contractor
([33], Art. 46, esp. 46(6); [35]; reg. 75). If the Secretary-General dis-
agrees with the Contractor, the Draft Regulations specify that there are
just 30 days to register that disagreement ([35], reg. 75(3)). Otherwise,
the applicant’s / Contractor’s designation of conﬁdentiality will pre-
sumably stand for the duration of the application or contract (proposed
to be 30 years). The opinions of external experts will only be sought if
the matter is taken by the Contractor to a formal dispute panel ([35],
reg. 75(3) & 92). Third parties, such as ISA members and observers,
other experts, or the general public, are not able to dispute con-
ﬁdentiality.
The existing Mining Code speciﬁes that “…data and information
relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment,
in particular those from environmental monitoring programmes, shall
not be considered conﬁdential” ([31], reg. 7(1)). Nevertheless, no such
data have yet been released. Madureira et al. [49] suggest that the lack
of environmental data sharing is not intentional but rather a result of a
failure to implement modern data reporting standards, which the au-
thors (some of whom are members of the ISA’s Legal and Technical
Commission (LTC)) claim will be solved by the use of a new reporting
template recently developed by the LTC.
The 14 standards examined do not generally specify the format /
form of the information or data to be made available, though this can
greatly aﬀect the utility of the information. Up-to-date data (and meta-
data) standards that reﬂect commonly adopted technologies help en-
sure that the data are usable. The Aarhus Convention simply speciﬁes
‘in the form requested’ unless another format is already publicly
available or otherwise more practical ([2], 4.1(b)16). The ISA has re-
cently created reporting forms [32], but has not yet agreed to digital
data standards. Given the oceanographic setting for seabed mining,
adherence to standards adopted by the UN International Oceanographic
Commission and the Global Ocean Observing System could provide
valuable guidance for the environmental observing data and reporting
standards.
Only about one third of the standards (5/14) explicitly recognise
that some information may be held as conﬁdential, usually char-
acterised as being commercially sensitive or proprietary. Only one of
the 14 standards we examined outlines a procedure to determine con-
ﬁdentiality ([20], Section 3.2). In all cases, however, there is an as-
sumption that once conﬁdential / exempted information is separated
out, the remainder of the information will be made available.
Consideration for embargoing information, whereby there is a
possibility that proprietary information can be released after a certain
time, is not mentioned in the standards (0/14). However, this is now a
common feature of publicly funded research grants, where data and
publications must be released “within a reasonable time” (e.g. [4]; Art.
917), which typically ranges from 6 to 24 months ([56]; Section 3.618).
Likewise, it is a consideration in the ISA’s Mining Code, whereby in-
formation associated with exploration contracts more than 10 years old
may be released.19 To our knowledge, however, no data have yet been
released by the ISA under this provision.
In contrast to the exploration contracts, the Draft Regulations do
specify that exploitation contracts, redacted of conﬁdential informa-
tion, should be made publicly available ([35]; draft reg. 12(3)).
3.2. Reporting
Reporting is related to, but distinct from, access to information, in
that it involves disclosure –either voluntary or mandatory. Reporting
typically summarises activities and data for the beneﬁt of the regulator
and/or the public. Whilst reporting alone has been criticised as some-
times being conﬂated with sustainability [53] and that companies’ re-
ported claims under voluntary initiatives need to be treated with cau-
tion, reporting can bring to light good practices as well as areas of
possible concern that might otherwise go undetected [21]. However,
there is also a need to critically engage the mining industry towards
more accurate reporting [21].
In one standard examined (Global Reporting Initiative; GRI), re-
porting is the central theme. Most of the standards have some sort of
reporting requirement, outline what needs to be reported upon and the
level of detail (11/14). Most of these also specify the reporting fre-
quency (9/14). In the standards reviewed, which party makes the re-
ports available varies, sometimes being the proponent (e.g. businesses
adhering to the GRI) and sometimes the regulator (e.g. International
Maritime Organization; IMO) as regards the London Convention and
Protocol, or in the case of third party accreditation, the third party (e.g.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; EITI) and often the pro-
ponent as well (e.g. World Bank). There does not appear to be a best
practice in this regard, and this question is still under discussion in the
one draft standard we examined (IRMA). Reporting can also apply to
State Parties, such as under the Aarhus Convention, or in the case of the
ISA, contracting States.
Although the ISA has longstanding reporting requirements, now
using a reporting template eﬀective as of 2016, none of the Contractor’s
annual reports submitted to the ISA have been made publicly available.
15 In another, however, access to documents is limited to signatories (London
Convention and Protocol –note iii, Table 1.
16 The Aarhus Convention also speciﬁes that data shall progressively be made available
in publicly accessible electronic databases (Art. 5.3).
17 Applicable to granting by US National Science Foundation.
18 Applicable to granting by the UK Natural Environment Research Council.
19 E.g. ISA Nodule regulations, ISBA/19/C/17, 36(4): “Ten years after the date of
submission of conﬁdential data and information to the Authority or the expiration of the
contract for exploration, whichever is the later, and every ﬁve years thereafter, the
Secretary-General and the contractor shall review such data and information to determine
whether they should remain conﬁdential. Such data and information shall remain con-
ﬁdential if the contractor establishes that there would be a substantial risk of serious and
unfair economic prejudice if the data and information were to be released […]”.
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Neither has the LTC explained the rationale behind its recommenda-
tions to accept these reports (none have been rejected). Likewise,
Finance Committee reports do not include audited statements or similar
explanatory details. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to assess whether ISA re-
porting requirements have been met, and whether the reporting (and
the forthcoming data) templates are being adhered to.
The ISA’s Draft Regulations are currently silent on the question of
releasing Contractors’ annual reports ([35]; draft reg. 37).
3.3. Quality assurance
Quality assurance mechanisms instil conﬁdence in the information
being provided. Quality assurance can extend from the collection of raw
data, their analyses, through to reporting. Regulators will typically set
minimum standards for baseline data. It may be up to the regulator to
monitor for quality assurance, or in the case of third party certiﬁcation,
the third party (or an assessor certiﬁed by it). Voluntary codes of
conduct often rely upon the respondent to self-monitor. While quality
assurance is a broadly accepted best practice (10/14), most of the
standards examined did not explicitly require public reporting of quality
assurance (just 2/14, with limited requirements –Table 1), though in
some instances it may be inferred as part of the general reporting re-
quirement.
Public access to scientiﬁc information (i.e. to raw data and meta-
data) could allow for further independent veriﬁcation of reported re-
sults and also provide another avenue of quality assurance through
public scrutiny. In the standards examined, however, the possibility of
public veriﬁcation does not appear as a rationale for access to in-
formation.
In the ISA, quality assurance of applications and annual reporting is
carried out by its Legal and Technical Commission; however, the details
of these assessments are not made public, and it is uncleaer whether
data contained within annual reports have been independently veriﬁed.
3.4. Compliance information / accreditation
Although the standards range from voluntary to mandatory, there is
the expectation in all of them that signatories / parties will seek to
abide by them. However, a means by which to assess how well parties
are actually adhering to the standard (i.e. a compliance information
mechanism and/or an accreditation process) is not always a component
of the standards, particularly the ‘softer’ principle-based ones, and ap-
pears in half of the standards here (7/14). Clearly there is some disin-
centive on the part of the parties to self-report non-compliance.
Nevertheless, the value of compliance reporting in voluntary standards
should not be under-estimated, as that in the absence of more formal
legal structures, this is one of the few ways by which volunteer parties
can point out problems in the standard, request technical assistance,
and ultimately demonstrate their adherence. Determining compliance
can be diﬃcult, and has been a key driver of revisions to some of the
standards here, particularly those that provide accreditation (e.g., EITI,
GRI). In the absence of compliance reporting, it has proven diﬃcult for
responsible secretariats to determine whether well-intended voluntary
standards are indeed being followed (pers. comms. with the OSPAR
Secretariat and the IMMS).
The ISA currently does not publish compliance information (nor
does it accredit activities). It is therefore unknown the degree to which
compliance is being evaluated. Likewise, the degree to which
Contractors accurately report their activities is also unknown.
3.5. Public participation
Public notiﬁcation and participation in environmental decision-
making is now broadly accepted to be international best practice.
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
[58] and the Aarhus Convention [2] both recognise the need for public
participation and the importance of public access to information in
facilitating participation. The standards examined likewise broadly re-
ﬂect this principle (11/14 to an extent; 10/14 more speciﬁcally
–Table 1). However, application of this principle varies widely. The
Aarhus Convention speciﬁes a clear procedure (Art. 6.1(d).) It con-
tinues: “Procedures for public participation shall allow the public to
submit, in writing or, as appropriate, at a public hearing or inquiry with
the applicant, any comments, information, analyses or opinions that it
considers relevant to the proposed activity” (Art. 6.7). Such an ap-
proach is now common in national environmental impact assessment
procedures [46] and could be implemented at multiple points
throughout the life of a deep-sea mining project [12].
With regard to assessing possible environmental impacts of DSM
exploration applications and the awarding of said contracts, the ISA has
not to date consulted the public, relying exclusively on the re-
commendations of its Legal and Technical Commission (LTC), which
deliberates behind closed doors. (To date, all exploration applications
have been approved.) However, concerning exploitation and the on-
going development of these regulations, the process has been more
inclusive. The ISA has since 2015 used the internet to solicit public
comments.
The ISA Discussion Document [34] uses the term ‘transparency’
frequently, mainly with regard to public participation and access to
decisions. However, the ‘public’ is diﬀerentiated from ‘Interested Per-
sons’ and ‘Appropriately Qualiﬁed Experts.’ The former is used mainly
with regard to public awareness and public concerns; but with regard to
consultations, the latter two terms are employed. Much of the public
consultation discussed in the January 2017 Discussion Document is not
reﬂected in the August 2017 Draft Regulations; however, the term In-
terested Person(s) is retained, and deﬁned as: “a natural or juristic
person or an association of persons that, in the opinion of the Authority,
is directly aﬀected by the carrying out of Exploitation Activities in the
Area or who has relevant information or expertise” ([35]; schedule 1).
Note that neither ISA State Parties nor Observers are necessarily in-
cluded in this draft deﬁnition, relying upon the opinion of the ISA.
3.6. Ability to review and appeal decisions
In addition to a public consultation procedure, most of the standards
(such as those of the World Bank and IFC) also recognise the need for a
public appeal / grievance mechanism; i.e. the ‘third pillar’ of the Aarhus
Convention (9/14 broadly, 8/14 more speciﬁcally –note ii, Table 1).
The purpose of such a mechanism is to allow reasonable public concern
to be heard, with the possibility of revising or reversing a decision.
The ISA currently has no analogous review and appeal procedure in
place. All contracts are ultimately to be approved by the State Parties of
its largest body, the Assembly, after having been recommended by the
LTC and approved by its executive body, the Council. In practice, this
has occurred within the two-week period of its annual meeting. Legally,
it is possible that Assembly may delay a vote pending an advisory
opinion of the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the law of the Sea ([38]; UNCLOS, Art. 159.10), though this has
never occurred. State Parties and other related parties (e.g. Contractors)
may raise certain issues with ITLOS, for example concerning inter-
pretation of the terms of their contract, and such hearings would be
public unless the Tribunal decides otherwise, or unless the parties de-
mand that the public not be admitted (UNCLOS, Annex VI, 3.26.2).20
However, with regard to reviewing ISA decisions, ITLOS’s powers are
strictly limited by UNCLOS Article 189, which eﬀectively removes
ITLOS as a possible avenue for grievance or appeal:
The Seabed Disputes Chamber shall have no jurisdiction with regard
to the exercise by the Authority of its discretionary powers in
20 To date, no such hearings have ever been held.
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accordance with this Part; in no case shall it substitute its discretion
for that of the Authority […] the Seabed Disputes Chamber shall not
pronounce itself on the question of whether any rules, regulations
and procedures of the Authority are in conformity with this
Convention, nor declare invalid any such rules, regulations and
procedures […].
The Zero Draft [33] allows for only the Contractor to appeal deci-
sions regarding the awarding, prolongation, or termination of their
contract, and conﬁdentiality of their information. Third party requests
(e.g. from civil society) for appeal or review are not considered. The
Draft Regulations [35] contains no speciﬁed appeal procedures.
3.6.1. ISA’s internal review process with regard to transparency
UNCLOS article 154 requires the ISA to undergo an internal review
every ﬁve years. The ISA began operating in 1996 and commenced its
ﬁrst review in 2015. An independent consultancy released its interim
report in 2016 [59], which was subsequently revised based on com-
ments at the ISA’s 2016 session and afterwards [60]. In these two re-
ports by the consultants, there were many instances where transparency
was raised, and four (of 34) ﬁnal recommendations have transparency
as the central focus ([60]; rec. 31–34).
In early 2017, the ISA’s internal review committee published its own
report in response. The diﬀerences in opinion between the external
consultancy and the internal ISA committee are striking. Variants of
some of the consultants’ recommendations can be found; e.g. opening
up portions of LTC meetings ([36]; rec. 16). However, concerning data
sharing, there is only provisional recognition that there might be an
issue (“…the sharing and accessing of environmental data collected by
contractors seems to require improvement” ([36]; rec. 6)). The con-
sultants, suggest that the ISA should develop a policy on transparency
and conﬂicts of interest and revise its regulations to set standards for
conﬁdentiality ([60]; rec. 31). However, no such recommendation ap-
pears in the ISA’s review committee report. The general rationale
provided for not including some of the consultants’ recommendations
is:
[…] The Committee decided not to pursue some of the re-
commendations as it became evident during its deliberations that
they were quite far removed from the practices that the Authority
had developed over the past 20 years and were currently unlikely to
be accepted by consensus. […] ([36].; para. 7).
It is worth recalling that in the ISA’s rules of procedure, voting is
permitted in both Council and Assembly when consensus cannot be
found ([29,30]; rules 56 and 61, reﬂecting the annex to the Part XI
Agreement, [70] Section 3.5). However, the core of the Committee’s
explanation risks giving the impression that because the ISA has not yet
developed policies on data transparency, conﬂicts of interest, or stan-
dards for conﬁdentiality, it is unlikely to do so. The Article 154 Review
Committee report was subsequently accepted at the ISA’s 2017 annual
session in August.
4. Conclusions
The six components of good practice that emerged from this analysis
are: i) access to information; ii) reporting; iii) quality assurance; iv)
compliance information / accreditation; v) public participation; and vi)
ability to review / appeal. It is posited here that these six expressions of
best practices in transparency, which appear consistently across natural
resource governance, should also be applicable to DSM.
The rules and regulations of the ISA have been forward thinking in
some respects, such as allowing for the release of information after a
given time period, and calling upon a precautionary approach (though
more needs to be done to operationalise it [40]). Furthermore, the Draft
Regulations do indicate that transparency may be improving in some
regards (e.g. making exploitation contracts publicly available). In many
other ways, however, the ISA’s rules, regulations, and procedures do
Table 2
Recommendations arising from this analysis.
Component Recommendationsa
i Access to information 1. Develop ISA policies on a) transparency, b) criteria and a process for determining when information is conﬁdential.
2. Strengthen Draft Regulations to require publicly accessible data and information relating to the protection and preservation of the
Marine Environment, as well as health and safety.
3. Develop an electronic database(s) compatible with existing international standards, capable of housing all data collected by
contractors.
4. Require publication of exploration and exploitationb contracts.
ii Reporting 5. Publish annual reports submitted by Contractors.
6. Publish annual (audited) ﬁnancial statements.
7. Require Committees to explain in their reporting to Council the rationale behind recommendations, including alternatives that were
considered, and any dissenting opinions.
8. Publish environmental scoping reports, environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring and closure plans.c
iii Quality assurance 9. Develop quality assurance / quality control (QA / QC) standards that the LTC and Finance Committee will follow when assessing
data and reports.
iv Compliance information /
accreditation
10. Require ISA Committees to report annually on QA / QC results for each active Contract, as well as compliance with reporting
requirements.
11. Allow for independent third-party veriﬁcation of scientiﬁc data and ﬁnancial information.
12. Establish a publicly visible process for addressing non-compliance.
v Public participation 13. Continue to solicit public comments on the development of regulations.
14. Report back on comments received and how they were addressed.
15. Expand public participation as discussed in the 2017 Discussion Document, including dedicated access to Committee meetings.
16. Broaden the deﬁnition of ‘Interested Persons’ to include, inter alia, ISA State Parties and Observers, and a process to determine
eligibility.
vi Ability to review / appeal decisions 17. Establish a mechanism to allow for review and appeal of ISA decisions, including requests from third parties, concerning, inter
alia, awarding and terms of contracts; approval of plans of work, environmental assessments and closure plans.
18. Re-consider the next Article 154 review committee structure such that a balance of external experts are included in its
membership.d
a Recommendations concerning the release of information assume that any conﬁdential information will be identiﬁed and redacted (see recommendation 1b).
b The Draft Regulations require publication of exploitation contracts but existing exploration regulations do not.
c The Draft Regulations are silent on the question of ﬁnal reports, but do require publication of the drafts.
d Equal balance of internal – external membership in review committees is commonly accepted practice in regional ﬁsheries management organisations.
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not reﬂect modern best practices. Applying to the ISA the six expres-
sions of best practices in transparency found here, several deﬁciencies
were revealed: environmental and safety information have not been
made available; annual reports are treated as conﬁdential; quality as-
surance is unclear and not reported upon; compliance of States and
contractors to ISA and related obligations is not reported upon; public
participation is limited, with observers unable to participate in, or ob-
serve, key committee meetings; and, there are very limited avenues for
civil society (or States Parties) to seek review or appeal of ISA decisions.
By not providing access to critical information, the ISA is at the
mercy of its detractors. DSM is contentious, and spurious accusations
are very diﬃcult to evaluate or to defuse.21 Improved transparency,
while not suﬃcient on its own, is nonetheless a key element of natural
resource governance that is accountable, and thus more likely to yield
desired trust from, and enduring beneﬁts for, civil society, consistent
with the common heritage of humankind principle. The ongoing
drafting of ISA’s DSM exploitation regulations oﬀers a once-in-a-gen-
eration opportunity to build greater accountability and trust through
greater transparency and public cooperation, for current and future
generations.
The results of our analysis clearly suggest that the International
Seabed Authority will need to develop additional rules, regulations, and
procedures if it wants to align with the international standards eval-
uated here. Contemporary transparency practices that have arisen from
experiences in analogous industries could improve the long-term sta-
bility of the ISA. The rationale of the ISA’s Article 154 Review
Committee to not pursue several of the recommendations of the in-
dependent consultancy, including the development a transparency
policy, remains obscure ([60]; rec. 31). This recommendation and other
possible areas of improvement as a result of our analysis are sum-
marised below (Table 2).
Because current ISA practices do not generally reﬂect international
best practices in transparency, ensuring accountability from either the
institution or its contractual parties engaged in mining will be diﬃcult.
Adding transparency to the ISA’s rules, regulations, and procedures
would further enable critical scrutiny, open debate, and informed de-
cision making concerning the common heritage resources of the Area
beyond national jurisdiction.
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